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Abstract 
We present two experiments investigating the effect of the perceived gender of a 
magician on the perception of the quality of magic tricks. In Experiment 1, tricks performed 
by an allegedly female magician were considered worse than those by an allegedly male 
magician. In Experiment 2, participants had to generate possible solutions to how the tricks 
were done. Under these conditions, male participants were better at explaining the tricks, but 
the gender effect found in Experiment 1 disappeared. We discuss the gender bias in 
Experiment 1 and the lack of bias in Experiment 2 in terms of specific social and cognitive 
mechanisms (e.g., cognitive dissonance).  
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In the seminal paper by Goldberg (1968), college women were more critical when 
evaluating journal articles that appeared to be written by a woman (i.e., Joan T. McKay) than 
when written by a man (i.e., John T. McKay). Although the statistics presented at the time 
were rather elementary, the effects appeared larger for articles written on male-dominated 
fields (i.e., law and city planning) than neutral (i.e., linguistics and art history) or female-
dominated topics (i.e., elementary school teaching and dietetics). Goldberg (1968) interpreted 
this gender bias as illustrating the distortion that precedes prejudice. Generally, these results 
illustrated how gender can act as a catalyst for biased representations of reality.  
Although this seminal paper strongly indicated prejudicial beliefs against women (and 
by women), some authors have questioned its actual relevance (e.g., Swim, Borgida & 
Marruyana, 1989). Aside from its obvious statistical weakness (i.e., Goldberg only presented 
descriptive statistics), Swim et al. (1989), in their meta-analysis, argued that subsequent 
studies that addressed such a gender bias were characterized by weak effect sizes. Swim et al. 
(1989) did acknowledge, though, that gender bias effects could emerge when people have 
less information about the protagonists. For example, only giving a protagonist name might 
be sufficient to activate the bias. However, when more information about the protagonist is 
provided, the bias diminishes.  
Although the underlying mechanisms modulating this gender effect are still not fully 
understood (see Koch, D’Mello & Sackett, 2015, for a discussion on possible mechanisms), 
some factors that enhance the effect have been identified. First, stereotypical expectations 
play an important role in activation gender biases. Second, the effect seems to emerge more 
strongly when stereotypical male-dominated activities are evaluated (e.g., Koch et al., 2015; 
Colley, North & Hargreaves, 2003; Proudfoot, Kay, & Koval, 2015; Swimm et al., 1989).  
In this paper, we concentrate on magic, a domain that has received little attention in 
terms of these mechanisms, yet it is strongly male-dominated, or at least considered as such. 
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In a recent norming study, Misersky, Gygax, Canal, Gabriel, Garnham et al. (2014) collected 
social norms for more than 420 occupations and activities across 7 languages (i.e., Czech, 
English, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, and Slovak), and found that the work of 
magician was considered as more likely to be carried out by men. On average, across all 
languages, participants considered that only 26% of magicians were women (29% in the 
French-speaking part of Switzerland where the present study was carried out). This perceived 
proportion of women as magicians has been stable over the last decade (i.e., 24% in the 
French part of Switzerland in 2008; Gabriel, Gygax, Sarrasin, Garnham, & Oakhill, 2008). 
This male-magician prevalence could be anchored in the history of magic, where 
women have essentially been relegated to “lovely assistants” (Bruns & Zompetti, 2014). It 
has also often been difficult for women to gain access to this rather secretive organisation, 
and for many years women were denied access to major magic associations (Nardi, 1988). 
For example, London’s Magic Circle – one of the largest magic associations – granted 
permission for women to enter the association only in 1991. From a historical perspective, 
women performing magic throughout the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries were often associated 
with witchcraft. In fact, women behaving in any non-normative ways were often associated 
with witchcraft, and subsequently burnt or punished (Chollet, 2018) and during the early 19th 
century, many found success only in roles as psychics or mediums (Bruns & Zompetti, 2014; 
Nardi, 1988). Houdini’s later embodiment of masculinity set the standards in the magic 
entertainment industry (Mangan, 2007), which confined women as weak and vulnerable 
(Bruns & Zompetti, 2014), or powerless (Nardi, 1988).  
We would argue that these attributes – and their founding history – constitute a perfect 
example of gender stereotypes. Gender stereotypes can broadly be defined as generalized 
beliefs and expectations about social roles or occupations, that are considered appropriate 
based on individuals’ socially identified sex (Eagly, 1987). These roles can often be 
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summarized along two main dimensions: communion and agency (e.g., Eagly, 1987; Eagly, 
1997, Eagly & Wood, 1991). Whereas communal attributes refer to friendliness, 
unselfishness, concerns with others and emotion expressiveness, and are associated to 
women, agentic roles refer to independence, assertiveness, instrumental competence and 
masterfulness, and are associated to men (Eagly & Wood, 1991). Attributes typically 
associated to magicians, such as power and control (Nardi, 1988), clearly fall under agency. 
Through different socialization processes, these attributes become internalized as part of an 
individual’s self-concept and personality, and act as basic foundations for subsequent 
behaviours (Eagly, 1997). In turn, these stereotypes influence how we evaluate other people’s 
behaviours (Eagly & Wood, 1991). For example, Colley et al. (2003) asked participants to 
listen to instrumental music extracts composed by allegedly female or male composers. 
Afterwards, they were required to evaluate the extracts on several musical competence items. 
The authors argued that since music composition has historically been considered a 
stereotypically male-dominated activity (Green, 1997), participants should rate them more 
highly when the piece is introduced as composed by a man (i.e., Klaus Behne or Simon 
Healy) than by a woman (i.e., Helena Behne or Sarah Healy). Participants did indeed give 
lower ratings on adjectives relating to musical competence for the female pieces. This effect 
was strongly alleviated when the name was accompanied by the composer’s alleged 
biography. Similarly, Proudfoot et al. (2015) found that for an identical architectural 
outcome, men were evaluated as more creative than women.  
 Others have found similar gender biases when focusing on male-dominated activities, 
even when small descriptions of the targeted protagonists were provided. For example, 
Sczesny, Spreeman, and Stahlberg (2006) showed participants small descriptions of female or 
male protagonists, together with a picture and a name tag (i.e., Mrs or Mr Keller). The small 
descriptions contained leadership characteristics, which are stereotypically male. When asked 
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to recall the leadership characteristics, participants felt more certain that the characteristics 
were present when these were associated to a man than when associated to a woman. 
Evaluations have also been shown to be biased when more subtle gender cues were given. 
For example, Fleischmann et al. (2016), showed that women wearing a feminine outfit (a 
dress and some makeup) – presented in a picture – were judged as having less computer skills 
than those with a neutral outfit (trousers and no makeup). Of interest, the success of a woman 
with a neutral outfit was more likely attributed to skill compared to that of a woman wearing 
a feminine outfit, where success was attributed to luck. This is in line with the seminal work 
by Deaux and Emswiller (1974) who showed that women performing well on a stereotypical 
masculine task (i.e., a perceptual discrimination task of mechanical objects) were considered 
to be “lucky”, whereas men were considered to be “skilled”. Of importance – at least when 
considering the expectancy-value theory of achievement motivation (Eccles & Wigfield, 
2002) – different attributions of success lead to different career, educational or activity 
choices. As such, investigating gender stereotypes in masculine contexts, such as magic, may 
uncover important factors that explain the relative low prevalence of women in these 
contexts. 
The present experiments 
The aims of the present experiments were twofold. First, we wanted to investigate the 
extent to which magic – one of the most male dominated art forms (Misersky et al., 2014) – 
activates gender attributes that are potentially linked to judgement biases. To address this, we 
followed Goldberg’s (1968) procedure and presented magic tricks as either performed by a 
woman (i.e., Nathalie) or by a man (i.e., Nicolas) (Experiment 1). We expected that magic 
tricks allegedly performed by a woman would be evaluated more negatively than when 
presented as performed by a man (Hypothesis 1).  
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Second, in Experiment 2, we expected that participants would evaluate a magic trick 
more positively when not (really) knowing how it was done. More specifically, we predicted 
that evaluating a trick negatively whilst at the same time not knowing how it was done would 
generate tension, or cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). To reduce this dissonance, one 
would most likely evaluate it more positively. To test this idea, the second experiment used 
the same information about the magician (i.e., their name), but asked participants to engage in 
an additional task: generate possible solutions. The gender cues therefore remained constant 
across experiments. This manipulation is rather different to those used in previous gender 
bias studies. Previous studies simply added additional information about the protagonists, 
which seemed to alleviate the gender bias (e.g., Colley et al., 2003; and as discussed by Swim 
et al., 1993).  
Accordingly, in Experiment 1, we expected participants to evaluate tricks performed 
by Nathalie more negatively than for Nicolas, but this difference should disappear in 
Experiment 2 (Hypothesis 2). In sum, if people struggle to come up with the true explanation 




Sixty-four psychology undergraduate students from the University of Fribourg took 
part in this experiment (Mean age = 22.80; SD = 4.15; n = 33 women). All students were 
granted course credit for participation and were part of a first-year research method class. All 
participants had granted written informed consent before the experiment.  
Design and Procedure. 
Participants were presented with fourteen video sequences, each presenting a close-up 
(i.e. close proximity) magic trick. The magicians wore white gloves and a white long-sleeves 
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t-shirt which prevented participants from identifying cues about the magician’s true gender 
(hereafter called sex of the magician). The magic tricks were performed by a female and male 
magician and all were performed in front of a neutral background1. Each participant saw 
seven sequences by the female magician, and seven by the male one. At the end of the 
experiment, participants were asked whether they noticed that there were two different 
magicians, and none of them did. Two lists were created, to ensure that each trick was 
performed by both magicians across the experiment, and that each trick was only presented 
once per participant.  
 For each participant, the magic tricks were presented in a random order. After each 
magic trick, participants had to answer three questions: (1) How good was the trick? (1=not 
good at all to 7=very good), (2) How impressive was the trick? (1=not impressive at all to 
7=very impressive), (3) Did you guess how the trick was performed? (1=not at all to 7=yes, I 
am sure of it). The former two questions were aimed at providing us with the crucial quality 
evaluations. The first question assessing a more global evaluation, and the second question 
assessing an evaluation more specific to magic. In essence, a trick considered as good may 
not necessarily be seen as impressive (this is especially true for tricks that one believes to 
have guessed how it is done2), and we wanted to make sure we covered all possible 
evaluative impressions. The latter question (i.e., guessing question) was, consequently, to 
explore whether the trick evaluations were impacted by whether participants discovered (or 
thought they discovered) the solutions of the tricks.  
Before starting the experiment, participants were presented with a cover story 
informing them that they had to evaluate some magic tricks. They were told that the tricks 
would be presented to the public, but that we wanted to get some insight into how people 
appreciate different types of tricks. Half of the participants were told that the tricks were 
performed by NATHALIE (i.e., female magician), and half were told they were performed by 
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NICOLAS (i.e., male magician). We chose a between-participant design to avoid participants 
discovering the purpose of the experiment (i.e., manipulating gender). Both names are very 
frequent in the French part of Switzerland, with the former unambiguously referring to a 
woman and the latter to a man. To ensure that participants would not forget who was 
performing the tricks, we repeated the name of the magician before each video sequence, by 
specifying: “Are you ready for the next trick by [NAME]”. Participants simply pushed the 
space bar to start the video. Videos were between 3 to 21 seconds long (Male magician: M = 
10.4, SD = 5.84; Female magician: M = 10.2, SD = 5.77). 
Results  
In order to include both participants and items (i.e., magic tricks) as random factors in 
all analyses and to avoid any fixed effect fallacies by separating by-participant and by-item 
analyses (Clark, 1973; Brysbaert, 2007), data were analysed by fitting linear mixed-effects 
models using the R software (R Development Core Team, 2010, version 3.1.2). Models were 
tested using the lmer() function of the lmer4 package of R, and model comparisons were 
assessed using the anova() function which calculates the Chi-square value of the log-
likelihood in order to evaluate the difference between models, following Baayen’s (2008) 
procedure. Models were compared using a forward-testing approach, from the simplest model 
to more complex ones, as advocated by Field (2014), and as commonly done in 
psycholinguistics research (e.g., Öttl & Behne, 2016). Namely, fixed effects (main and 
interaction) were included one at a time, and each resulting model was compared to a model 
that did not include the added factor. As justified by the design and to the extent that the 
model still converged, we included Sex of Magician as a random slope for items. The reason 
for doing so was that although changing the magician within each session (i.e., for each 
participant) remained unnoticed by participants, the quality of the magic tricks was not 
completely homogeneous, as shown by an overall slightly better evaluation – yet non-
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significant – of our male magician (male magician: M = 4.21, SD = 0.84; female magician: M 
= 3.96, SD = 1.03, t (13) = 1.28, p = .22, 95% CIdifference [-0.67; 0.17]) (our female magician 
was less experienced, as indicated by a lower number of years of practice compared to our 
male one). Finally, to obtain p-values for our final model, we used the summary() function 
from the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017)3.  
Results for the question: How good was the trick? 
When comparing our random model – only encompassing items and participants as 
random factors (and Sex of Magician as random slope for items), to one also including 
Perceived Gender of Magician (NATHALIE vs. NICOLAS), the latter showed a better fit, 
Δχ2 = 5.80, Δdf = 1, p = .02. However, adding the Respondent’s Sex or Sex of Magician did 
not improve the model.  
The final model (see Table 1 and Figure 1), including only Perceived Gender of 
Magician as fixed factor, showed that participants rated the tricks performed by NICOLAS 
more positively (M = 4.20; SD = 0.95, 95% CI [3.89; 4.52]) than those performed by 
NATHALIE (M = 3.96; SD = 1.10, 95% CI [3.57; 4.34], t(170.9) = 2.36, p = .019). It is 
interesting to note that numerically, Nathalie is just below the mid-point, whereas Nicolas is 






 Estimate SE df t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 4.36 0.27 25.99 16.37 <.001 
PERCEIVED GENDER OF MAGICIAN      
Female magician -0.45 0.19 178.33 -2.42 .017 
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Table 1. Model estimates for our best fitting model of how good a trick was, including 
Gender of Magician as fixed factor, participants and items as random intercepts, and Sex of 
Magician as random slope for items. Treatment contrasts were used. 
 
Results for the question: How impressive was the trick? 
The correlation between the first and second measure (How good is the trick? and 
How impressive is it?) was very high, r (62) = .94, 95% CI [.90; .96], p < .001. Not 
surprisingly then, when comparing our random model – which only encompassed items and 
participants as random factors (with both random intercept and random slope) –, to one also 
including Perceived Gender of Magician (NATHALIE vs. NICOLAS), the latter showed a 
better fit, Δχ2 = 5.23, Δdf = 1, p = .02. However, adding the Respondent’s Sex or Sex of 
Magician did not improve the model.  
The final model (see Table 2), including only Perceived Gender of Magician as fixed 
factor, showed that participants rated the tricks performed by NICOLAS more positively (M 
= 4.11; SD = 0.89, 95% CI [3.79; 4.43]) than those performed by NATHALIE (M = 3.88; SD 
= 1.01, 95% CI [3.51; 4.24] , t(161) = 2.15, p = .033). Again, numerically, Nathalie is just 
below the mid-point, whereas Nicolas is just above it.  
 
 Estimate SE df t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 4.25 0.28 24.15 15.33 <.001 
GENDER OF MAGICIAN      
Female magician -0.43 0.18 170.08 -2.29 .023 
Table 2. Model estimates for our best fitting model of how impressive a trick was, including 
Gender of Magician as fixed factor, participants and items as random intercepts, and Sex of 
Magician as random slope for items. Treatment contrasts were used. 
 
Results for the question: Did you guess the magic trick? 
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The correlation between the first and third question (How good is the trick? and Did 
you guess how the trick was performed?) was lower than between the first and second 
question, and was negative, r (62) = -.49, 95% CI [-.66; -.28], p < .001. The less participants 
thought they understood how the trick was performed, the more likely a trick was to be 
evaluated better.  
The initial random model (as for the previous question) was neither improved by the 
Gender of Magician, Δχ2 = .04, Δdf = 1, p = .84, nor Respondent’s Sex, Δχ2 = 1.47, Δdf = 1, 
p = .10 nor the Sex of Magician, Δχ2 = .79, Δdf = 1, p = .37. Even though our participants did 
think that Nicolas’ tricks were better than Natalie’s, they did not seem to be better at guessing 
them (NICOLAS: M = 3.80; SD = 2.00, 95% CI [3.57; 3.95]); NATHALIE: M = 3.76; SD = 
2.09, 95% CI [3.61; 3.98]). 
Complementary analyses 
Overall, these results support Hypothesis 1 and show that the magician’s perceived 
gender influences how people evaluate a magic trick: our male magician was considered 
better than the female one. As this effect was central to our hypothesis and as there has 
always been some level of controversy when examining such biases (e.g., Swim et al., 1989), 
we decided to calculate a Bayes factor on the effect of the perceived gender on how good the 
tricks were to assess the relative strength of our evidence. As such, we wanted to evaluate 
whether our data were sufficiently sensitive to truly support H1 (a gender effect) over H0 (no 
gender effect) (Dienes, 2014, 2016). In order to determine the evidence for H1 versus H0, the 
plausible range of effect sizes is needed. We took the women's score as defined by how much 
room to move there was for the men's score, in order for the latter to be evaluated as better 
(Dienes, 2018). Women scored approximately 4 on a 1-7 scale; thus, the men could score 
between 4 and 7 by way of being rated more highly than women. That is, the maximum 
difference we could obtain between men and women was 3 units. Dienes (2018a) 
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recommends using a Half-Cauchy distribution with scale factor maximum of 7 where effect 
sizes are expected to be relatively small. That is, following this heuristic the scale factor 
would be 3/7 = 0.43. Following the R procedure by Dienes (Dienes, 2018b website), our 
Bayes factor was calculated using a half-Cauchy distribution with a scale factor of .43. We 
used the difference of .24 as our sample mean, and SE of .10 (i.e., the raw difference divided 
by the t-value given by our model). Using the conventional cut-off of 3 suggested by Jeffreys 
(1939/1961), the resulting Bayesian analysis showed evidence for the existence of a 
perceived gender effect over the null hypothesis, B = 5.53 (B = 4.18 for how impressive the 
trick was).  
Discussion 
We argue that such a gender effect is the direct consequence of the gender stereotypes 
associated to magicians, and the related social beliefs as to magicians’ competencies, as 
predicted by Social Role Theory (Eagly, 1987). Namely, some people may believe – and 
have internalized – that there are more male magicians than female magicians because male 
magicians are more competent, leading them to believe that any male magician is generally 
better and more impressive than any female one. This effect illustrates the pernicious effects 
of stereotypes, leading to prejudiced evaluations.  
As we gave very limited information on the magicians (i.e., just their names), it could 
be the case that our bias may vary, depending on the context in which it occurs. Such a variance 
has been shown in previous studies (e.g., Colley et al., 2003; Swim et al., 1989). As such, we 
wanted to examine a particularity inherent to magic (i.e., trying to spot the solution of the trick), 
and see whether it could lessen the gender bias we found. In a sense, we wanted to give 
participants some sort of opportunity to justify their lower evaluation scores. To our 
knowledge, this has never been done before. In reference to the present experiment, regardless 
of whether participants claimed they had or had not guessed the tricks, they were not asked to 
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provide any concrete solutions to explain how the tricks were done. Thus, they were not 
exposed to any dissonance between their biased judgement (the female magician is less 
impressive) and the difficulty of providing a convincing explanation to unfamiliar tricks 
(especially if they did not have any). Note that even when participants claimed to have guessed 
the tricks in the present experiment, we cannot be sure that this was the case. Some participants 
may even come up with general superficial and easy – hence wrong – explanations (e.g., the 
use of a rigged deck), derived from some sort of shallow processing.  
In this vein, one could argue that a way to alleviate the gender effect found in 
Experiment 1 would be to force participants to come up with an (in-depth) explanation after 
each trick. Having to provide an explanation for something for which no (easy) explanation 
can be found, may trigger a cognitive dissonance. As such, people may find it difficult to 
evaluate a trick negatively when they do not know how the trick was performed (i.e., two 
incompatible thoughts), leading participants to judge all tricks as “better”, legitimizing the 
difficulty to provide a convincing solution. In the next experiment, we therefore asked 
participants to generate a possible solution as to how the trick was done for each trick. We 




One hundred and seventy-three Psychology undergraduate students from the 
University of Fribourg took part in this experiment (Mean age = 21.4; SD = 3.91; 107 
women) in two different batches (N1=91 from 2017; N2=82 from 2018; see below for 
details). All students were granted course credit for participation and were part of two 
different research method classes (i.e., two different years) – none had participated in the first 
experiment . All participants granted their written informed consent before the experiment. 
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Design and Procedure. 
The design and procedure of this experiment was the same as in Experiment 1, except 
that we asked a fourth question after each trick: Even if you have not guessed the trick, please 
provide us with an explanation as to how the trick was performed. Participants simply had to 
type in their answer.  
 Before the analyses, participants’ explanations were coded by two independent male 
magicians from Besançon, following the code: 1 = good answer / answer with the key 
element / possible answer, 0 = wrong answer / answer not precise enough. Participants’ 
explanations were presented randomly to the coders, who were blind to the experimental 
conditions. There was high agreement between the two magicians, κ = .89, p < .001. For the 
5.32% disagreement (i.e., 124 answers out of 2331), a third magician discussed the answers 
with the initial coders, until all coders agreed on a final coding.  
Results 
Again, as in Experiment 1 and as justified by the design and convergence, we 
included Sex of Magician as a random slope for items. As in Experiment 1, although 
participants did not notice the change of magician within each session, the quality of the 
magic tricks was not completely homogeneous, as shown by an overall slightly better 
evaluation – yet non-significant – of our male magician (male magician: M = 4.42, SD = 
0.75; female magician: M = 4.19, SD = 1.01, t (13) = 1.40, p = .185, 95% CIdifference [-0.59; 
0.13]). Finally, again, to obtain p-values for our final model, we used the summary() function 
from the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Bruun Brockhoff & Haubo Bojesen Christensen, 
2014).  
Results for the question: How good was the trick? 
Figure 1 shows the mean rating as a function of magician’s perceived gender. We 
compared our random model – encompassing items and participants as random intercept and 
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Sex of the Magician as random slope for items – to one also including Perceived Gender of 
Magician (NATHALIE vs. NICOLAS). The latter did not show a better fit, Δχ2 = 0.24, Δdf = 
1, p = .63 (NATHALIE: M = 4.27; SD = .943, 95% CI [4.08; 4.46]; NICOLAS: M = 4.34; SD 
= .94, 95% CI [4.13; 4.56]). In fact, no other factor (i.e., Sex of Respondent or Sex of 
magician as fixed factors) improved the random model.  
Note that the initial analysis was conducted on 91 participants (first batch from 2017). 
Since the model including Gender did not show a better fit with 91 participants, Δχ2 = .84, 
Δdf = 1, p = .36, we decided to calculate a Bayes factor to assess the relative strength of our 
evidence and determine whether the non-significant effect of our Perceived Gender of 
Magician factor was due to data insensitivity (e.g., lack of statistical power) or was true 
support of the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis (in this case, the results of 
Experiment 1) (Dienes, 2014, 2016). We followed the same procedure as in Experiment 1, 
and for simplicity and coherence used the same scale factor of .43. As suggested by Jeffreys 
(1939/1961), the Bayesian analysis showed that the data were clearly insensitive to detect 
either the null hypothesis or the alternative one, B = .73 (B = .49 for how impressive the trick 
was). We therefore decided to run another batch of participants (second batch from 2018) to 
see whether we could get enough power to detect either the null hypothesis or the alternative 
one, as advocated by Dienes (2014). With an additional 82 participants, our Bayesian analysis 
showed that the data were approaching evidence of the null hypothesis over the difference 
found in Experiment 1, B = .41 (B = .61 for how impressive the trick was), partly supporting 
Hypothesis 2.  
 Although a statistical comparison between experiments is rather delicate, as the factor 
with vs. without explanation was not run within the same experiment, we conducted an 
analysis on a potential interaction between experiments and the Perceived Gender of 
Magician. We compared a random model – encompassing items and participants as random 
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intercept and Sex of the Magician as random slope for items – to one including Perceived 
Gender of Magician (NATHALIE vs. NICOLAS) and Experiment (Experiment 1 vs. 
Experiment 2). The latter did not show a better fit, Δχ2 = 2.72, Δdf = 3, p = .437. We still 
computed the latter model to extract the necessary values to calculate a Bayes factor, 
following the same strategy as for the main effects of each experiment. The Bayes factor, B = 
.78, suggested that the data were neither sufficiently sensitive to substantiate H0 (there is no 
interaction between experiments) nor H1 (there is an interaction between experiment). We 
will come back to this issue in the Discussion section.  
Results for the question: How impressive was the trick? 
The correlation between the first and second measure (How good is the trick? and 
How impressive is it?) was again very high, r (171) = .89, 95% CI [.854; .917], p < .001. Not 
surprisingly then, when comparing our random model – encompassing items and participants 
as random intercept and Sex of the Magician as random slope for items – to one also 
including Perceived Gender of Magician (NATHALIE vs. NICOLAS), the latter did not 
show a better fit, Δχ2 = 0.844, Δdf = 1, p = .358 (NATHALIE: M = 4.00; SD = .963, 95% CI 
[3.805; 4.196]; NICOLAS: M = 4.14; SD = .984, 95% CI [3.918; 4.365]) (B =.61). As in 
Experiment 1, no other factor (i.e., Sex of Respondent or Sex of magician as fixed factors) 
improved the random model.  
Results for the questions: Did you guess the magic trick? & How was it done? 
The correlation between the first and third question (How good is the trick? and Did 
you guess how the trick was performed?) was low and negative, yet significant, r (170) = -
.369, 95% CI [-.491; -.232], p < .001. As in Experiment 1, we present the same analyses as 
for the first two questions. In addition to the analysis of the question Did you guess the magic 
trick?, we also analysed participants’ actual response accuracy. 
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Although adding Perceived Gender of Magician did not improve the initial random 
model, Sex of Respondent did, Δχ2 = 8.422, Δdf = 1, p =.004. The model estimates are 
shown in Table 3. These results showed that women were less likely to claim to have 
correctly guessed the secret (M = 3.44, SD = .971, 95% CI [3.26; 3.63]) than men (M = 3.89, 
SD = .983, 95% CI [3.650; 4.13] , t(170) = -2.931, p = .004). Adding any other factor did not 
further improve the model.  
 
 Estimate SE df t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 3.901 0.228 23.17 17.09 <.001 
SEX OF RESPONDENT      
Female participants -0.449 0.153 170.32 -2.93 .004 
Table 3. Model estimates for our best fitting model for how for participants claiming to have 
guessed the tricks, including Sex of Respondent as fixed factor, participants and items as 
random intercepts, and Sex of Magician as random slope for items. Treatment contrasts were 
used. 
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Figure 1. Comparison between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 for the effect of Gender of 
Magician (i.e., Nathalie vs. Nicolas). The model including Gender of Magician was 
significant in Experiment 1, whereas it was not in Experiment 2 
  
Of interest, there was a significant correlation between participants claiming to have 
guessed how the trick was done (i.e., Did you guess how the trick was performed?) and their 
actual knowledge of the secret, r (170) = .320, p < .001, 95% CI [.179; .448]. Male 
participants also generated more correct explanations than female participants (Female 
participants: M = .364, SD = .135, 95% CI [.338; .390]; Male participants: M = .409, SD = 
.142, 95% CI [.374; .444], t(132) = 2.02, p = .045). We will come back to this effect in the 
General discussion section.  
General discussion 
In two experiments, we presented participants with magic tricks and asked them to 
evaluate each of them in terms of how good and how impressive they were. In Experiment 2, 
participants were additionally required to generate possible solutions as to how each of the 
tricks were done. In both experiments, following the procedure introduced by Goldberg’s 
(1968) seminal work, half of the participants were made to believe that the tricks were 
performed by a woman, and half by a man. This manipulation was independent of the 
magician’s true gender. In Experiment 1, participants felt that the tricks performed by a man 
were better than those allegedly performed by a woman, which supported our predicted 
gender effect (Hypothesis 1). This is in line with Goldberg’s (1969) initial results, showing 
that participants were more critical of journal articles written by women than by men, 
especially when the content of the articles was related to male-dominated fields. However, 
once participants had to generate possible explanations about how the tricks were done 
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(Experiment 2), the data suggested that the gender difference found in Experiment 1 may be 
fluctuant, and depend on different evaluation strategies, partly supporting Hypothesis 2.  
Social Role Theory 
The results of Experiment 1 are in line with Social Role Theory. Our participants – in 
line with the history of magic – may have internalized the belief that men have better 
dispositions for magic than women, and as such are better performers, irrelevant of their 
actual performance. We could further claim that our participants in Experiment 1 were facing 
some level of incongruency – following Eagly and Karau’s (2002) Role Congruity Theory – 
between a masterful, competent magician and a woman. Blending both information may well 
be challenging, hence the female magician was judged as less competent. Note that even if 
the female magician had been evaluated as similarly competent to the male one, Role 
Congruity Theory would predict the female magician are still evaluated less favourably on 
other dimensions (i.e., more emotional, …). This could actually be the case in Experiment 2, 
although we have no data (yet) to warrant such an idea.   
Still, the different patterns of results between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 do hint 
at the possibility that different mental mechanisms, or strategies were at stake in these 
experiments. Applying different strategies when making judgements is reminiscent of the 
idea that we often make judgments based on simplifying strategies (i.e., heuristics), rather 
than on extensive algorithmic processing (e.g., Parzuchowski, Bocian, & Gygax, 2016; 
Kahneman, Tversky, 1996). Indeed, as presented in the introduction, there are numerous 
other domains in which gender stereotypes influence people’s judgements. However, in the 
current paper we begin to show that when pushed towards making more analytical 
judgements (as in Experiment 2), superficial and simplified information (i.e., stereotypes) 
might be less influential. 
The role of cognitive dissonance 
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Although a more detailed description of the mechanisms involved is only speculative 
at this point – the data in Experiment 2 were not entirely conclusive –, we still would like to 
suggest a possible explanation. Since the reduction in gender bias was based on mechanisms 
not directly related to the actual magician, our explanation deviates from those which focus 
on individuation (i.e., giving more information about the protagonists than just the name, as 
in Colley et al., 2003). As such, we propose that the seemingly attenuated gender effect 
reported in Experiment 2 may be rooted in some sort of reduced dissonance. Nardi (1988) has 
argued that people often feel powerless when tricked by conjuring effects, and that they feel 
cognitively challenged by the magician. Being fooled and impressed by a magician may 
therefore result in a cognitive conflict which is decreased if we presume that the trick was 
performed by a good magician. As such, participants may be more comfortable to admit to 
having been fooled by someone stereotyped as a good magician (the male magician) than by 
someone stereotyped an inferior one (the female magician). Consequently, in Experiment 1, 
participants evaluated the female magician as less impressive than the male one. In 
Experiment 2, participants were under pressure, as they were confronted with two opposing 
drives: on the one hand, being confronted with a female (inferior) magician, yet on the other 
hand not being able to understand how they were fooled, whilst actively searching for a 
solution. The latter most likely overpowering the former to reduce the dissonance, resulting 
in better evaluations – at least numerically – of the female magician’s tricks in Experiment 2 
than in Experiment 1. One could also argue that forcing participants to come up with possible 
solutions to tricks that they just evaluated may push them to be accountable for their 
evaluations. As such, when participants give any score, they become accountable for giving 
it, and only by giving a correct solution can they warrant a negative evaluation. Based on the 
seminal work by Tetlock and colleagues on accountability (e.g., Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 
1989), some studies have actually shown gender biases to disappear when participants are 
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made accountable for their decisions in professional settings (e.g., Girvan, Deason, & 
Borgida, 2015).  
However, more research is needed to provide more substantial evidence of this idea. 
Future research might focus on possible dissonance mechanisms by measuring the relative 
discomfort generated by being fooled by a female magician without understanding how the 
trick was done and being asked to explain the trick. Also, our data cannot dismiss the idea 
that the gender bias found in Experiment 1 was only apparent because reading the magician’s 
name was the only other task beside simply watching the trick. In this sense, it could be the 
case that any more resource-demanding task (i.e., trying to find a solution), may exhaust all 
available resources, preventing participants to actually consider gender as a relevant cue. This 
could well explain the fact that many studies (e.g., Colley et al., 2003) did not find gender 
bias when additional and individuating information regarding the target protagonist was 
given.   
The role of confidence 
As a final note, we found interesting that male participants were more confident that 
they guessed how the tricks were done, and they also came up with more correct solutions. 
These results dovetail Nardi’s (1988) observation that “Although most people respond 
similarly to a trick, men more often than women state they also know one, or publicly attempt 
to figure out how it was done”. One tentative explanation of such a gender effect is that it 
may arise from the gender stereotype boosting men’s confidence to find the right solution 
whereas lowering confidence in women. The activation of the gender stereotype associated to 
magic may well activate lower self-efficacy in women, through the well-documented 
mechanism of stereotype threat, mimicking effects found in computing skills research (e.g., 
Christoph, Goldhammer, Zylka, & Hartig, 2015) or mathematics (e.g., in Spencer, Steele & 
Quinn, 1999). Consequently, and following the expectancy-value theory of achievement 
Gender Stereotypes and Magic 23 
motivation (e.g., Eccles & Wigfield, 2002), women may not feel as legitimate as men to 
generate possible solutions. In fact, this may also explain the rather low number of women in 
magic, especially if women – as in other domains that are stereotypically male (Dickhäuser & 
Stiensmeier-Pelster, 2002) – attribute their failures more to internal, global, stable and 
uncontrollable factors than they do for their success.   
Conclusion 
To sum up, there are many factors that can contribute to the appreciation of magic, 
and we have shown that some of these factors could be grounded in social biases, such as 
gender stereotype. However, neither of our experiments allow us to determine exactly at 
which temporal level of a magic trick appreciation the suggested effects take place. Namely, 
to evaluate a magic trick, different cognitive (and social) processes are at stake, and it is yet 
difficult to determine which one is most sensitive to social biases.  
To conclude, whatever process is at stake here, female magicians have it harder (and 
are prejudiced to refer back to Goldberg’s discussion), and identical performances may be 
less appreciated. Our findings dovetail Bruns and Zompetti’s (2014) observation: “Women in 
magic are still “muted” in the mainstream magic entertainment circuit and seen as a novelty”. 
However, our study suggests a possible way in which these gender stereotypes can be 
alleviated, although the data are not yet entirely conclusive. We still hope that future research 
will concentrate on all possible ways to alleviate gender biases during magical performances, 
and the world more generally.  
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Footnotes 
1 All videos can be accessed at https://drive.switch.ch/index.php/s/WmqODuOlXd5maAr 
with the password: “magic” (note: that although some videos have sound, they were muted in 
the experiments). 
2 For example, knowing how David Copperfield made the Statue of Liberty disappear most 
likely affects the impressiveness of the trick (i.e., it is less impressive), yet it remains a very 
good and ingenious trick. 
3 The original data and analysis R scripts (of Experiments 1 & 2) can be accessed at 
https://osf.io/tqsx5/. 
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